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Foreword 
Phillip Granberry’s report on the increasing voter turnout of Latinos in Massachusetts 
and nationwide is an encouraging sign that Latinos are finally reaching their potential 
within the electorate. There have been glimmers of hope before, but this is particularly 
bright for three reasons. First, this is a report about the midterm elections, which 
usually see a far lower turnout than presidential elections. This is important because to 
the extent that it may be a response to any particular political or economic condition, it 
is more likely to be sustainable if it does not depend on the presence of a particular 
presidential candidate on the ballot. This is particularly so for Massachusetts, where the 
2018 midterm elections featured few high-profile competitive contests.  
Second, as Granberry explains, this was not a simple matter of new voters registering 
and entering the electorate. In fact, turnout significantly outpaced registrations. This is 
another sign of sustainability. All things being equal, for the Latino electorate to reach 
its potential one would need new voters to register—especially as the Latino population 
is disproportionately younger compared to other groups—but also infrequent voters to 
turn out with more regularity. The fact that both of these things happened further 
implies that this is not dependent on a particular temporal event. 
Finally, although there was a surge in turnout among all groups, it was particularly 
concentrated within the Latino electorate. This is crucial. If turnout had been equally 
distributed among the voting public, it would strongly suggest that the surge was in 
response to some specific person or event which might evaporate once those conditions 
changed—as it did after the 2008 election. Instead, this might be a sign that Latinos are 
discovering their own political efficacy—a collective realization that their vote matters 
would be the clearest predictor of future higher turnout. 
 
What this report cannot answer is why the Latino vote surged in this election. As 
Granberry rightly points out, the single most important explanation for the discrepancy 
between Latino population numbers and their meager impact at the ballot box has 
always been that a considerable part of Latinos are ineligible to vote given that they lack 
American citizenship. Still, even among those who can vote, many opt not to. Even 
worse, historically this apathy has registered at a far higher rate than other groups as 
Granberry shows in this report. The literature has tried to solve this puzzle and has 
found that there is a U-shaped pattern in Latino participation where third-generation 
and first-generation/naturalized citizens vote at higher rates than second-generation 
Latinos.1 This appears to be at least in part because of disappointment with voting as a 
tool for change. Other factors include how institutions, particularly civic ones, shape 
Latinos’ engagement,2 and in the case of first-generation immigrants who opt not to 
vote, the age at which Latino immigrants arrive in the United States. The older they 
arrive in the US the less likely they are to be engaged and vice-versa.3 More than 
 
    The Mauricio Gastón Institute for Latino Community Development and Public Policy | September 2020                           3 
anything, however, what predicts political participation is a shared sense of being part of 
a racialized group that is under threat in some way, for instance by the threat of 
deportation—even when someone is a citizen.4 That is why President Trump’s rhetoric 
and policies have had such a mobilizing effect on Latinos.5 
Granberry’s report, especially his finding that naturalized citizens voted at a higher rate 
than US-born Latinos in 2018, is consistent with the literature in suggesting that racial 
threat as personified by Trump’s policies may have been a catalyst for the surge in 
voting both nationwide and in Massachusetts. If that is the case, the question then 
becomes whether this period has created a politicized identity that will outlive Trump’s 
period in office or whether it will subside once he is gone or his anti-immigrant policies 
change. We cannot be sure as of yet, but for now, Latino’s political power seems to have 
finally be on its way to achieving its potential. 
 
Luis F. Jiménez, PhD 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
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The Increasing Latino Vote in Massachusetts 
In the 2018 United States midterm election, voters turned out in impressive numbers. 
The turnout rate was the highest for a midterm election since 1978. Latinos helped lead 
the way:, although their 40.4% turnout (of the citizen, voting-age population) was lower 
than the overall national figure of 53.4%, it represented an increase of 13 percentage 
points over the previous midterm election in 2014. A larger share of naturalized Latino 
citizens voted, 44.2%, than did U.S.-born Latinos, 39.0%. With the growing Latino and 
Asian populations in the United States, the share of Non-Latino White voters declined 
from 76.3% in 2014 to 72.8% in 2018, while the Latino share increased from 7.3% to 
9.6% of all who voted. 
In Massachusetts, 55.5% of the citizen voting-age population voted in the 2018 mid-
term election. Among Latino citizens, the turnout was 42.7%, an increase of more than 
25 percentage points over the 2014 midterm election. The share of Non-Latino White 
voters declined from 92.4% in 2014 to 82.8% in 2018, while the Latino share increased 
from 2.4% to 6.5% of all who voted. 
As the Latino population is projected to grow to over 15% of Massachusetts' population 
by 2035, their voting will become more critical in future election outcomes. However, 
two factors limit their importance. First, 22% of all adult Latinos in Massachusetts are 
not U.S. citizens, and cannot register to vote. Only Asians have a larger share of non-
citizens (40%), while 19% of Non-Latino Blacks and 4% of Non-Latino Whites are not 
citizens. Not only are Latinos less likely to be citizens, but they also have a younger 
population, with many below voting age. The median age of Latinos in 2017 was 28 
years, compared to 44 years for Non-Latino Whites, 33 for Non-Latino Blacks, and 34 
for Asians. The combination of these two voting requirements limits the share of Latino 
voters to 54%. Only Asians with 49% of their population voting-eligible have a lower 
voting-eligible share. Both Non-Latino Whites with 80% and Non-Latino Blacks with 
62% have larger voting-eligible shares of their populations. 
This report analyzes Current Population Survey data from 2002 to 2018. The data are 
generated from replies to survey questions about whether individuals were registered 
and/or voted in specific national elections. The Census Bureau releases the data on the 
federal and state level in tabular form. 
This report examines the Latino vote in national midterm and presidential elections 
from 2002 to 2018. Voter turnout typically is higher in presidential than in midterm 
elections. In Massachusetts, elections for governor occur in midterm election years, and 
this could increase the voter turnout compared to other states that do not have the same 
gubernatorial election schedule. These census data do not include information on local 
elections unless they overlap with national elections. Latinos hold more elected 
positions in city and town government than they do in state government, and this could 
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increase their voter turnout in these local elections. 
 
Registered Voters 
Figure 1 reports the number of Latino registered voters in Massachusetts in mid-term 
elections from 2002 to 2018. Over this time, the number of Latino registered voters 
increased by over 236%. The most significant increase occurred between the 2014 and 
2018 elections, when an additional 94,000 Latinos registered to vote in Massachusetts. 
Figure 1: Registered Latino Voters in Massachusetts Mid-Term Elections, 2002-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2002-2018 
 
Voter Turnout 
Figure 2 reports the number of Latino voters in Massachusetts mid-term elections from 
2002 to 2018. Over this time, the number of Latino voters increased by over 284%. The 
number of Latino voters declined in 2010 and 2014 from the 2006 election, but 124,000 
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Figure 2: Latino Voters in Massachusetts Mid-Term Elections, 2002-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2002-2018 
The increase in Latino voting from 2014 to 2018 suggests that Latinos in Massachusetts 
are continuing to develop their political power. However, this process continues at a 
slow pace because so many Latinos lack eligibility to vote. In 2017, 811,038 Latino 
resided in Massachusetts, and they made up 11.8% of the state's population. However, 
Figure 3 shows that they made up only 6.5% of voters in the 2018 mid-term election. 
Figure 3: Voting Population in Massachusetts Mid-Term Elections  
by Race and Ethnicity, 2002-2018 
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The final two figures compare the voting behavior of Massachusetts' citizen voting 
population. Figure 4 shows that the share of Latino (and also Black and Asian 
populations) who are registered to vote is approaching that of the majority Non-Latino 
White population. In 2018, 60% of Latino citizens were registered to vote compared to 
71% of Non-Latino White citizens. Thus, if this trend continues by the 2022 mid-term 
election, the two populations will have similar shares of their citizen population 
registered to vote. (The Current Population Survey data did not report voting 
characteristics for the citizen population until 2006, and thus the 2002 mid-term 
election data are missing.) 
Figure 4: Citizen Voter Registration in Massachusetts Mid-Term Elections  
by Race and Ethnicity, 2006-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006-2018 
Increasing voter registration is only part of the voting process. The share of Latino 
citizens who voted in 2018 reached its highest level at 43%. This turnout was lower than 
for Non-Latino Whites (59%). However, as previously mentioned, this was part of the 
record voter turnout in a mid-term election for Latinos. This voter turnout was 
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Figure 5: Citizen Voter Turnout in Massachusetts Mid-Term Elections  
by Race and Ethnicity, 2006-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006-2018 
Similar to other voters, Latino voters in Massachusetts increased their turnout in the 
2018 mid-term election. There was an increase in voter registration, but the voter 
turnout outpaced this gain in registrations. Overall, Latinos made up less than 7% of the 
voter turnout in this election. Thus, Latinos in the state can claim more political power 
with increased voter turnout. The 2020 election appears to be drawing the political 
interest that motivated the increased 2018 participation. This election will provide 
another opportunity for Latinos to increase their vote and thus acquire more political 
power in the state. Even with this increased voter turnout in 2018, more Latino citizens 
did not vote than did, and the Latino vote in 2020 can be higher if more effort is made 
to increase the Latino vote. The Gastón Institute will report on this election after the 
2020 election Current Population Survey data are released. 
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